SHub Stealer PCAP Analysis: Finding C2 in Encrypted Traffic
By PcapAI team · Published: July 7, 2026
On 22 June 2026, malware-traffic-analysis.net published a capture of a Mac infected with SHub Stealer. Two weeks earlier I walked through the AMOS infection, which was an analyst’s gift: the whole C2 protocol ran over plain HTTP and we simply read it. This capture is the exact opposite. Every payload byte is wrapped in TLS 1.3 — PcapAI’s summary page counts cleartext protocols at 0.1% of the captured bytes — and the same report scores the overall risk 69/100, Elevated, with a High-severity threat on top. Both readings are correct, and that is the whole point of this SHub Stealer PCAP analysis: when you cannot read a single payload byte, the infection is still written in the metadata — the names a host resolves, the direction its bytes travel, and the clock its connections keep. This is 2026-06-22-SHub-Stealer-infection-traffic.pcap read the way I would in an incident, entirely without decryption.
The capture at a glance: 99.9% encrypted, risk 69/100
One victim: 10.6.22.216, an Apple endpoint (MAC fc:fc:48:59:43:87) sitting behind a Cisco gateway at 10.6.22.1, which also serves as its only DNS resolver. Across 14,874 packets and 9.2 minutes, the host moves about 15 MB — and 97% of the external bytes terminate behind Cloudflare (AS13335). Not one HTTP request in the clear, not one readable payload. The adversary rented the same CDN your legitimate SaaS uses, and the entire attack hides inside it.
Capture
9.2 minutes · 14,874 packets · 15.2 MB, 100% TLS. SHA-256 7c260b42…55d4dc8c.
The victim
10.6.22.216 (Apple) · gateway/resolver 10.6.22.1 (Cisco) · seven malicious FQDNs, all on Cloudflare.
PcapAI’s executive summary calls the incident before any human looks at the packets: overall risk 69/100, Elevated; on top, a High-severity threat — an upload from 10.6.22.216 to the C2 server 104.21.35.23, mapped to MITRE T1041; under it, the one-minute beacon to the same server (T1071.001) and the disposable-TLD domains of the lure chain (T1566.002):
The report’s executive summary: a High threat built entirely from encrypted traffic — direction, rhythm and domain names, no decryption involved.
Before walking the packets, here is the whole incident on one clock — every timestamp below comes straight from the capture:
t+0.0s DNS just4software.pro the lure site (.pro, France)
t+36.1s DNS newcdn5.host06q.cfd payload host on a .cfd domain
t+39.1s TLS generatee4026c.host06q.cfd stealer backend, 3 sessions
t+43.1s TLS sharee4026c.host06q.cfd stealer backend, 1 session
t+43.9s DNS beta6.fastlinkpulse.click one-shot redirect hop
t+44.9s DNS lan31.swiftlinktap.click one-shot redirect hop
t+45.8s TLS i2seperefiles.com 12 MB arrives (yes, arrives)
t+138.1s DNS 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com new C2, paired with api.ipify.org
t+236.4s TLS 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com 2.2 MB leaves in 10.8 seconds
t+250s.. -- beacon every ~61 seconds until the capture ends
t+0s — the lure is a software blog with a .pro domain
The very first frame of the capture is the story in miniature: a DNS query for just4software.pro. The name answers to 82.25.113.147, a French-hosted server 149 ms away, and over the next 73 seconds the Mac pulls about 104 kB from it over TLS 1.3. The supporting cast gives the page away as an ordinary-looking freeware blog: stats.wp.com and s.w.org (a WordPress build), even a l.facebook.com widget. Someone went looking for “free software” and found a page dressed for the part.
Packet #1 of the capture is already the lure: the just4software.pro lookup, then a TLS session whose SNI names the site in cleartext — encryption hides the page, not the destination.
This is the delivery stage — T1566.002, Phishing: Spearphishing Link in MITRE terms: a link that leads a human to a page that hands them malware. PcapAI flags the TLDs themselves: just4software.pro, the .cfd domain about to appear and two .click names land in one Medium-severity indicator — cheap, disposable TLDs are themselves a signal, because legitimate software vendors almost never live there. The report keeps it at low confidence, and rightly: a TLD alone convicts nothing. For 36 seconds nothing else happens. That gap is a person: reading the page, finding the download button.
t+36s — the .cfd chain: encrypted C2 behind Cloudflare
At t+36.1s the Mac asks for newcdn5.host06q.cfd — and macOS asks twice, an A query and an HTTPS (type 65) query in the same microsecond, a detail that will matter later when the report grades DNS health. The first usable A record takes 3.1 seconds and several retries to arrive; the answer is a Cloudflare pair, 104.21.79.198 and 172.67.147.208. Then the subdomains start narrating the operation the way the AMOS stage beacons did, just in the names instead of the URLs: generatee4026c.host06q.cfd and sharee4026c.host06q.cfd — generate and share, two API verbs wearing hostnames, both carrying the same 4026c token that reads like a campaign ID.
Four TLS sessions go up to that pair of IPs between t+39s and t+43s; one of them stays open for 245 seconds. Their payloads are opaque by design — this is TLS 1.3, and random-looking bytes are what any encrypted session carries — so what convicts them is everything around them: the throwaway TLD, the API-verb hostnames, and what the host does next. Two more domains flash by and are never touched again — beta6.fastlinkpulse.click and lan31.swiftlinktap.click, single-visit redirect hops with names generated by the pound. Every one of these hosts resolves to Cloudflare edge space. The infrastructure has no face: no hosting provider to complain to that is not also fronting a million legitimate sites.
t+46s — twelve megabytes, and the direction test
At t+45.8s the biggest flow of the capture opens: i2seperefiles.com — a name cosplaying as a file-sharing service — on yet another Cloudflare IP, 104.21.5.95. The connection lives 479 seconds and carries 12 MB, the biggest number in the capture — and PcapAI raises no finding for it. That is right, and the reason takes one click to check: open Statistics → Conversations, look at the per-direction columns.
Wireshark → Statistics → Conversations (TCP)
endpoint A endpoint B A→B B→A duration
10.6.22.216:64061 ↔ 104.21.5.95:443 232 kB 12 MB 479.3 s
10.6.22.216:49162 ↔ 104.21.35.23:443 2,246 kB 70 kB 10.8 s
The 12 MB moved toward the Mac — 12 MB down, 232 kB up. That flow is not loot leaving; it is delivery — the disk image, a second stage, whatever the download button was serving. The capture cannot name the file, but it can prove which way the bytes went, and direction is the difference between “we lost 12 MB of data” and “12 MB of malware arrived.” The row below it is the real theft, and we will get there at t+236s.
The download itself is violent. Wireshark puts 3,140 of the flow’s 3,141 retransmissions inside a single second and a half (t+46.8 to t+48.3) — 31.13% of the flow’s frames, with 582 duplicate ACKs — and the report’s network section counts 34.2 percent packet loss on that connection, mostly on data the server sent: the download direction again. One malicious flow, seen from the performance side.
t+138s — a domain only a machine could love
Ninety seconds of quiet, then the second act. At t+138.1s the host resolves 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com — eighteen characters of keyboard noise, the kind of name no marketing department ever approved. Two frames later it asks api.ipify.org “what is my public IP?” — a legitimate free service, beloved of stealers, and a textbook T1016.001 (Internet Connection Discovery): the implant geolocating its new victim. A 77 kB pull from the new domain follows, sized like a config or a small module.
There is a quieter tell in the port numbers. The browsing session — lure site, WordPress assets, Apple services — walks the ephemeral range from 64043 upward all capture long. The connections to 8790tn….com and api.ipify.org start fresh at exactly 49152 — the bottom of the IANA ephemeral range — and count up on their own. Two port sequences, interleaved in time: what it reads as is two different programs on one machine, the browser that started this and the implant it installed.
t+236s — the actual exfiltration takes eleven seconds
Between t+228s and t+250s the implant opens seven quick sessions to 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com. Six are small. The seventh, at t+236.4s, pushes 2,246 kB from the Mac to the server in 10.8 seconds — the direction column leaves no doubt this time. That is the harvest leaving: on a stealer infection, an upload this size is the browser-credential store, cookies, session tokens, wallet files, whatever the collection modules bagged. TLS hides the manifest — unlike the AMOS capture, we cannot read the file names — but a corporate endpoint pushing two megabytes to an eighteen-character domain minted behind Cloudflare is not a software update.
In ATT&CK terms this is T1041, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel: the loot rides the same encrypted pipe the tasking uses, and that is how PcapAI files it: an upload of 2.1 MB of payload to a server the host checks in with on a schedule, the High-severity threat at the top of the report. Note the economics of the whole exchange — 12 MB in, 2.2 MB out, eleven seconds of theft inside a nine-minute capture. If your detection strategy waits for gigabytes to move before it cares, this incident never trips it.
The 61-second heartbeat that outlives the capture
From t+250s to the last frame, the implant settles into a rhythm: an api.ipify.org check, then a call home, every 60.7–60.9 seconds — set the Wireshark time column to deltas and the grid is impossible to miss:
t+310.6s api.ipify.org t+310.8s 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com
t+371.3s api.ipify.org t+371.5s 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com +60.7s
t+432.0s api.ipify.org t+432.2s 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com +60.7s
t+492.8s api.ipify.org t+493.0s 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com +60.8s
t+553.6s api.ipify.org t+553.9s 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com +60.9s
capture ends at t+554.3s
Machine-regular, unattended, still checking its own IP before every call — C2 over web protocols (T1071.001) with a one-minute leash. PcapAI’s periodicity check finds the same grid: six connections at a steady 61-second interval. On its own that is an indicator; next to the upload to the same server, it is the C2 case. The final beacon fires 0.4 seconds before the capture stops. The pcap ends; the infection does not. Whatever host this was, at t+555 it was still owned.
Where the report is right — and where the packets sharpen it
Automated analysis earns trust on the ambiguous calls, so here is the honest ledger. The big things PcapAI gets right with no human help: the upload to the C2 server (T1041), the one-minute beacon to the same server (T1071.001), the disposable-TLD lure chain (T1566.002), and the only advice that matters in the first hour: isolate 10.6.22.216 now. Three calls deserve an analyst’s pencil:
The 12 MB flow is a delivery, and the report does not call it anything else. It raises no finding for the i2seperefiles.com elephant flow, because its upload checks count bytes per direction and nothing left on that connection. If your incident paperwork lists it, list it as the payload that arrived. What left the building is ~2.2 MB of credentials, not 12 MB of files.
The beacon alone would be weak. The report keeps the periodic connections at medium confidence, and that is the right weight for a schedule on a shared edge: sync clients keep a rhythm too. What makes the server a C2 server is the 2.2 MB upload on it, which is why the upload, not the beacon, tops the report.
Do not stop at the IP block. The report’s first step blocks 104.21.35.23 at the edge; do it, but that address is a Cloudflare anycast edge shared with legitimate sites — collateral today, useless tomorrow when the domain re-resolves elsewhere. The durable control is DNS: sinkhole the five domains, and policy-block the .cfd/.click TLDs if your business does not need them. The roadmap’s domain review (A07) is where that decision gets made.
The report’s remediation roadmap: block and isolate first, then scope the data and the fleet. For a Cloudflare-fronted C2, add the DNS-layer blocks an IP rule cannot give you.
The verdict and the runbook
Assembled in order: a fake-software lure on a disposable TLD, a payload delivered from a file-host lookalike, encrypted C2 with API-verb hostnames, an IP check, a 2.2 MB upload, and a one-minute heartbeat still alive at the last frame — a complete stealer kill chain reconstructed without decrypting one byte. PcapAI’s executive summary compresses it into one page you can paste into the ticket; its second half puts the upload on the traffic chart and lists the first actions:
The executive summary’s second half: the upload marked at 19:18:32, the beacon window after it, and the first actions — block, scope, rebuild.
As a runbook: isolate 10.6.22.216 first. Sinkhole all five domains — host06q.cfd (with subdomains), fastlinkpulse.click, swiftlinktap.click, i2seperefiles.com, 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com — and add TLD policy for .cfd/.click. Then assume the 2.2 MB that left at t+247s was everything a stealer reaches: rotate browser-saved passwords, kill active web sessions (the cookies are gone), move crypto wallets, revoke local API tokens. Image the host before wiping it. Finally, hunt the fleet for the same shape — the SNI list and the 61-second cadence — because lures are rarely visited by exactly one person.
Indicators of compromise
From this public sample — treat as historical, the Cloudflare IPs especially will rotate and are shared infrastructure:
| Indicator | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 10.6.22.216 | Victim host | Apple, MAC fc:fc:48:59:43:87 · resolver/gateway 10.6.22.1 (Cisco) |
| just4software.pro | Lure site | 82.25.113.147 (FR) · WordPress-built · first packet of the capture |
| newcdn5 / generatee4026c / sharee4026c .host06q.cfd | Payload + C2 | 104.21.79.198, 172.67.147.208 (Cloudflare) · TLS 1.3, API-verb subdomains · listed TLD (T1566.002) |
| beta6.fastlinkpulse.click · lan31.swiftlinktap.click | Redirect hops | 104.21.3.153 / 104.21.4.123 · one visit each · T1566.002 |
| i2seperefiles.com | Payload delivery | 104.21.5.95 · 12 MB inbound at t+46s · 31.13% retransmission |
| 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com | C2 / exfil server | 104.21.35.23, 172.67.211.159 · 2.2 MB upload at t+236s · 61s beacon · T1041 |
| api.ipify.org | Abused service | Legitimate IP-echo API · 8 calls, one before each beacon · T1016.001 |
| 7c260b42…55d4dc8c | SHA-256 | Source PCAP |
Hunt the same shape in your own PCAPs
None of these exact domains will appear in your traffic. The shape will. Everything in this post came from four questions you can ask any capture, encrypted or not — and the first one is a single tshark line:
tshark -r capture.pcap -Y 'tls.handshake.type == 1' \
-T fields -e frame.time_relative -e ip.dst -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name
39.167 104.21.79.198 generatee4026c.host06q.cfd
43.197 104.21.79.198 sharee4026c.host06q.cfd
45.796 104.21.5.95 i2seperefiles.com
138.137 104.21.35.23 8790tn5c190y51v7n2.com
- Read every SNI in the capture. TLS encrypts pages, not destinations. Sort the list and eyeball TLDs (
.cfd,.click,.top…) and label shapes — an 18-character alphanumeric domain is its own confession. - Check direction before you say “exfiltration.” Statistics → Conversations, per-direction byte columns. Big inbound = delivery; sustained or bursty outbound to a young domain = theft.
- Treat IP-echo services as a tripwire.
api.ipify.organd friends from a corporate endpoint, on a timer, is malware asking where it woke up. - Look for a metronome. Fixed-interval connections to one destination — here 60.7–60.9s for five straight cycles — do not happen by accident. Humans are never that punctual.
Manual (Wireshark + tshark)
Extract and triage every SNI, cross-check DNS, sort conversations by direction, measure beacon deltas by hand, then map findings to ATT&CK. Doing this honestly took the better part of 1–2 hours.
PcapAI
The same capture returns a scored, MITRE-mapped report — the upload to the C2 server, the beacon, the TLD hits — in minutes, leaving the analyst the judgment calls above.
*Based on this 16 MB, 14,874-packet capture.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is SHub Stealer?
An infostealer distributed through fake-software lure pages, captured in the 22 June 2026 malware-traffic-analysis.net exercise infecting a macOS host. On the wire it behaves like the current stealer generation: TLS-only C2 behind Cloudflare, staged payload delivery, a single loot upload, and a fixed-interval beacon. The family name comes from the exercise artifacts; the network behavior is what this post documents.
Can you detect malware C2 in encrypted traffic without decrypting it?
Yes. TLS hides payloads, not behavior. DNS queries, the SNI in every Client Hello, per-direction byte counts, session timing, and payload entropy are all visible in a PCAP. In this capture those five signals alone reconstruct the full kill chain — lure, delivery, C2, exfiltration, beaconing — with zero decryption.
How do you tell a download from data exfiltration in a PCAP?
Open Statistics → Conversations in Wireshark and read the per-direction byte columns. Here the 12 MB flow was inbound (payload delivery) against 232 kB out, while the real theft was 2.2 MB outbound in 10.8 seconds to a different host. Direction is one click and changes the entire incident narrative.
Why not just block the C2 IP addresses?
Because every malicious host in this capture resolves to Cloudflare anycast space — addresses shared with countless legitimate sites and reassigned constantly. An IP block causes collateral damage today and does nothing tomorrow. Enforce at the DNS layer instead: sinkhole the domains, alert on the subdomain patterns, and policy-block disposable TLDs like .cfd and .click if the business does not use them.
What does C2 beaconing look like in Wireshark?
A destination that receives connections at machine-regular intervals. Filter to outbound SYNs, set the time column to “seconds since previous displayed packet,” and look for a repeating delta — this implant called home every 60.7–60.9 seconds for five straight cycles, each call preceded by an api.ipify.org lookup. An IO graph of connections per minute shows the same picture as evenly spaced spikes.
Real-world detections
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