Which MITRE ATT&CK techniques can be detected from PCAP files?

PcapAI detects 69 MITRE ATT&CK techniques spanning 11 tactics — from Reconnaissance through Impact — directly from PCAP and PCAPNG files. Every detection is derived from stateful deep packet inspection of real network traffic, not endpoint telemetry or log aggregation.

How does PcapAI map packet captures to ATT&CK techniques automatically?

PcapAI parses each capture in a single pass: link and IP headers, TCP sessions with sequence-aware, bounded message framing for TLS, Kerberos, SMB2, DCERPC, LDAP and HTTP, and UDP protocols such as DNS, SNMP and NBNS. 69 technique detectors then correlate requests with responses, apply protocol-specific rules and behavioral thresholds, and classify each result as a threat, an exposure or an indicator with its ATT&CK ID, tactic, severity, confidence and evidence. Findings are compiled into a structured PDF report; the free summary of a typical capture is ready in about two minutes, compared to hours of manual Wireshark inspection.

Can PcapAI detect Command and Control (C2) traffic?

Yes. The matrix covers 13 Command and Control techniques: periodic HTTP(S) session starts (T1071.001), DNS tunneling statistics (T1071.004), HTTP CONNECT proxies (T1090), Tor-like TLS handshakes (T1090.003), GRE tunnels (T1095), executable and script delivery (T1105), remote access tools such as TeamViewer and AnyDesk (T1219), dynamic DNS and domain generation algorithms (T1568, T1568.002), protocols on non-standard ports (T1571), ICMP tunnels (T1572), unclassified encrypted payloads (T1573.001) and C2-framework TLS certificates (T1573.002). Most C2 results are indicators: they tell the analyst what to verify on the endpoint rather than declaring a compromise.

How is this different from signature-based IDS?

Signature-based IDS tools like Suricata or Snort match traffic against fixed byte patterns, one packet or stream at a time. PcapAI correlates protocol exchanges across the whole capture (Kerberos AS-REQ and AS-REP pairs, DCERPC binds and operations, FTP control and data channels, HTTP requests and their responses) and applies behavioral thresholds such as interval regularity for beaconing, entropy for unclassified encrypted payloads and outcome ratios for scans. That catches activity no single packet reveals, such as Kerberoasting, DCSync or ARP-based interception, and every finding states its confidence and what remains unverified.

Is PcapAI's MITRE coverage limited to network-visible techniques only?

Yes, by design. PcapAI analyzes what is visible in the network layer — the PCAP file. Techniques that leave no network trace (such as local process injection or disk-only persistence) are outside scope. Every technique in this matrix is detectable purely from packet captures without requiring endpoint agents, EDR telemetry, or OS-level logging. This makes PcapAI particularly useful for incident responders who have a capture file but no access to the affected endpoint, and for SOC analysts validating network-layer indicators before escalating to endpoint investigation. Encrypted content (TLS 1.3 certificates, sealed RPC stubs, SMB3 encryption) limits what is visible, and the report states those limits.

69 Techniques · 11 Tactics · Network-Layer Detection

MITRE ATT&CK
Network Detection

Run Detection on My PCAP Browse Use Cases

SOC teams and incident responders rely on MITRE ATT&CK to classify adversary behavior, but mapping packet captures to technique IDs manually takes hours in Wireshark. PcapAI automates that work: upload a PCAP file and get a structured report with every matching ATT&CK technique ID, tactic, severity, and full evidence. The free summary takes about two minutes.

The matrix below documents every technique our analyzers can detect from raw PCAP and PCAPNG files. Detection logic is derived from stateful deep packet inspection, not endpoint telemetry or log aggregation, making it useful even when you have no access to the affected host.

Techniques: 69
ATT&CK Tactics: 11
Sub-Techniques: 39
Analysis Time: ~2 min

Detection Engine

MITRE ATT&CK Network Detection Matrix

Every technique below is detectable from a packet capture file using automated PCAP analysis — no endpoint agents or log collectors required.

Reconnaissance 3 techniques

T1590 Reconnaissance

Gather Victim Network Information

Flags DNS reconnaissance from one source: 20 or more unique failed subdomain lookups under one registered domain within 60 seconds, with reverse, local and DNSBL names excluded. DNS zone-transfer (AXFR) requests are correlated with the server's answer, so the report separates refused transfers from transfers that returned records, with the requesting host, server and zone.

T1595.001 Reconnaissance

Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks

Flags an external source that probes one service across 25 or more targets within 60 seconds with at least 60% confirmed failures (TCP reset or ICMP unreachable). Server replies to client ephemeral ports are never counted as scanning. One finding per scanner lists the targets and the services that answered.

T1595.002 Reconnaissance

Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning

Parses client HTTP requests only: scanner User-Agent tokens, 10 or more normalized sensitive paths within 60 seconds, or 20 or more paths with at least 80% 404/403 answers. A correlated 200 response that exposes /.env keys or a /.git/config file is reported as a separate exposure, with secret values withheld.

Initial Access 4 techniques

T1133 Initial Access

External Remote Services

Tracks new connections from external addresses to internal remote-access and VPN services such as SSH, Telnet, RDP, VNC, WinRM and PPTP. Isolated attempts are Low; 10 or more distinct attempts within 60 seconds raise the finding to Medium. A connection attempt is never reported as a failed or successful login.

T1190 Initial Access

Exploit Public-Facing Application

Inspects parsed client HTTP requests after percent and plus decoding (URL, body and selected headers) for SQL injection, XSS, path traversal, command injection, SSTI, Log4Shell, Shellshock, OGNL and deserialization payloads. Each match is reported as an exploitation attempt with the correlated server status, never as a confirmed compromise.

T1566.001 Initial Access

Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

Reads SMTP DATA/BDAT sent by the client and POP3/IMAP message retrieval, decodes MIME headers including RFC 2231 and RFC 2047 file names, and flags risky attachments: executables, scripts, macro-enabled documents and Base64-encoded PE headers. Evidence includes the envelope sender, subject and Message-ID; opening or execution is not inferred.

T1566.002 Initial Access

Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Flags contacted domains that imitate a popular brand through a typing slip or a look-alike glyph under the same public suffix, and domains on high-abuse TLDs: an indicator, cleared by a DNS answer from the brand owner's network. Internationalized names are decoded from punycode: one whose Cyrillic, Greek, Armenian or variant Latin letters make it display as a popular domain (xn--mazon-3ve.com displays as amazon.com, its first letter Cyrillic) is a High threat, and one that mixes Latin with another script in a label is Medium. These homographs are also read from TLS SNI, and the report prints the punycode name with the script of its substituted letters. Internal, reverse and service-discovery names are excluded. A lookup does not prove a phishing email or a click.

Execution 4 techniques

T1047 Execution

Windows Management Instrumentation

Detects DCERPC binds and requests to the WMI interfaces IWbemLevel1Login and IWbemServices, with DCOM activation as context. A SYN to port 135 or to a dynamic RPC port is never a finding on its own.

T1053.002 Execution

Scheduled Task/Job: At

Detects atsvc NetrJobAdd requests (opnum 0) over SMB named pipes or TCP RPC, with the requesting client and the target host. Job creation is reported as a request; execution of the job is not inferred.

T1053.005 Execution

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

Detects Task Scheduler SchRpcRegisterTask calls (opnum 1) and extracts the task XML and command line when the RPC stub is not sealed. Validate-only registrations are excluded, and sealed or partial stubs keep request-only evidence.

T1569.002 Execution

System Services: Service Execution

Detects svcctl StartServiceW calls (opnum 19) and links them through the service handle to a successful CreateServiceW and to an executable written to an administrative share earlier, reconstructing the PsExec-style sequence. Success reflects the service-control status, not proof that a payload ran.

Persistence 2 techniques

T1505.003 Persistence

Server Software Component: Web Shell

Flags HTTP requests to known web-shell paths, scripts placed in upload or static directories, and command fields that carry an OS command or a code-execution call such as whoami, cmd.exe or system(). A finding becomes Critical only when a correlated 2xx response contains command-output markers; 404 and 403 answers never confirm execution.

T1543.003 Persistence

Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

Detects svcctl CreateServiceW requests (opnum 12) and extracts the service name and binary path from the visible NDR stub. A correlated success response records the creation; the service binary itself is not inspected.

Defense Evasion 2 techniques

T1112 Defense Evasion

Modify Registry

Detects remote registry writes: winreg BaseRegSetValue requests (opnum 22) over SMB named pipes, attributed to the requesting client with the key path. Written values are withheld; the operation is reported for authorization review.

T1197 Defense Evasion

BITS Jobs

Flags payload downloads made with the Microsoft BITS User-Agent, excluding Microsoft and Windows Update domains. The same correlated executable or script evidence as ingress tool transfer is required; a User-Agent alone does not establish a BITS job.

Credential Access 14 techniques

T1003.002 Credential Access

OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager

Detects remote hive export, the secretsdump pattern: a winreg open of the SAM or SYSTEM hive linked through its context handle to BaseRegSaveKey (opnum 20). Reported as a High request; the status code alone does not prove that credentials were recovered.

T1003.004 Credential Access

OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets

Applies the same hive-export correlation to the SECURITY hive: a winreg open followed by BaseRegSaveKey on the same context handle. Reported as a High request without claiming that secrets were decrypted.

T1003.006 Credential Access

OS Credential Dumping: DCSync

Detects drsuapi DRSGetNCChanges replication requests (opnum 3) from a client the capture never shows acting as a domain controller. Replication between domain controllers is excluded using capture-wide KDC and LDAP server facts.

T1040 Credential Access

Network Sniffing

Extracts credentials sent without encryption (FTP, SMTP AUTH, POP3, IMAP, Telnet, PostgreSQL, LDAP simple bind, SNMP community strings, HTTP Basic and Proxy-Authorization) with the account, a masked secret, the server and the login outcome. Anonymous FTP is Low. Reported as an exposure: interception by an adversary is not implied.

See Use Case

T1110 Credential Access

Brute Force

Counts protocol-confirmed rejected logins from the authentication ledger, which covers FTP, SMTP, POP3, IMAP, HTTP, LDAP, PostgreSQL, MySQL, SNMP, VNC, Kerberos and NTLM over SMB. Ten or more rejections within 600 seconds form a finding, and a success after failures is reported separately. TCP resets, HTTP challenges and 403 responses never count as failed logins.

T1110.001 Credential Access

Brute Force: Password Guessing

Flags at least 10 correlated rejected attempts against one account and service within 600 seconds. Distinct password fingerprints raise confidence; plaintext passwords are never stored.

T1110.003 Credential Access

Brute Force: Password Spraying

Flags five or more accounts rejected with the same visible password, or a low-rate pattern of three or fewer attempts per account across many accounts. The second case is an indicator because password equality cannot be verified.

T1110.004 Credential Access

Brute Force: Credential Stuffing

Flags HTTP logins with 10 or more rejected distinct username/password pairs across at least five accounts and five passwords. The pattern is consistent with credential stuffing; the origin of the credential list is not verified.

T1187 Credential Access

Forced Authentication

Detects authentication-coercion calls that carry a visible UNC callback path: EFSRPC open, encrypt and decrypt (PetitPotam), print-spooler remote change notification (PrinterBug) and DFSNM root operations. Reported as request indicators, because backup and printing software can make the same calls.

T1552.006 Credential Access

Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences

Correlates SYSVOL tree connects with Group Policy Preferences file opens and reads. A non-empty cpassword attribute in the returned XML is a High exposure with the value withheld; a file-name request alone stays a Low indicator.

T1557.001 Credential Access

Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning

Pairs multicast and broadcast name queries with their answers within five seconds and flags a responder that answers with its own address for five or more different names within 60 seconds. Own-name answers and unicast WINS are excluded; SMB relay is not inferred from this rule.

T1557.002 Credential Access

Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Cache Poisoning

Tracks ARP claims and each host's internet next-hop MAC across the whole capture. Flags a MAC that claims several IPv4 addresses and then receives traffic the victims previously sent to the real gateway, and alternating claims for one IP. ARP probes, gratuitous announcements and VRRP/HSRP virtual MACs are treated as context, not attacks.

See Use Case

T1558.003 Credential Access

Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting

Groups issued TGS-REP service tickets encrypted with RC4 (etype 23) by client and counts distinct services, ignoring case, host-name aliases and krbtgt renewals. Six or more services within 10 minutes form a Kerberoasting pattern; a single RC4 ticket is a weak-encryption exposure, and RC4 offered in a request is normal negotiation.

T1558.004 Credential Access

Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: AS-REP Roasting

Correlates an AS-REP with an AS-REQ that carried no preauthentication on the same client socket, discarding candidates answered by PREAUTH_REQUIRED or followed by a preauthenticated, PKINIT or FAST retry. The report stores the principal, encryption type and times, never ticket ciphertext.

Discovery 11 techniques

T1012 Discovery

Query Registry

Detects remote registry reads: winreg BaseRegOpenKey requests (opnum 15) with the bounded key path, attributed to the requesting client.

T1016 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

Parses SNMP v1/v2c and flags SetRequest operations on network-configuration OIDs as High indicators of a configuration change, with the SNMP version and a masked community string. SNMP walks are reported under T1046; the result of the change is not confirmed. A script or tool without a browser User-Agent that asks a public-address lookup service for the network's address over cleartext HTTP is a Low indicator; the answer's values are never reproduced.

T1018 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

Flags ARP sweeps of 30 or more unique targets within 60 seconds, with probes and gratuitous ARP excluded, plus broad ICMP echo, reverse-DNS and NBNS name-query sweeps. IPv6 neighbor discovery, replies and repeated PTR lookups are excluded.

T1033 Discovery

System Owner/User Discovery

Detects wkssvc NetrWkstaUserEnum requests (opnum 2), which list the users logged on to a remote workstation, with the requesting client and target.

T1046 Discovery

Network Service Discovery

Classifies TCP connection outcomes per source: 25 or more ports on one host, or one port across many hosts, within 60 seconds with at least 60% failures, or a slow scan of 100 or more host:port pairs with 80% failures. UDP probes count only when an ICMP port-unreachable quotes them. One finding per scanner lists real targets and the services that answered.

T1049 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

Detects srvsvc NetrSessionEnum requests (opnum 12), which list SMB sessions on a remote server, with the breadth of servers queried by each client.

T1069.002 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups

Detects SAMR enumeration of domain groups and aliases (opnums 11 and 15) against domain controllers, attributed to the requesting client.

T1087.002 Discovery

Account Discovery: Domain Account

Detects SAMR user enumeration (opnum 13), bursts of LSA SID/name lookups, and Kerberos user enumeration: unknown-principal errors for 10 or more distinct names within 600 seconds. PREAUTH_REQUIRED errors alone are normal and excluded.

T1135 Discovery

Network Share Discovery

Flags a client that connects to six or more server/share pairs within 600 seconds, with IPC$, SYSVOL and NETLOGON excluded, and srvsvc NetrShareEnum requests (opnum 15).

T1482 Discovery

Domain Trust Discovery

Detects LDAP queries for trust attributes, cross-realm Kerberos trust principals, and lsarpc LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx and netlogon DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts calls. Ordinary LDAP and Kerberos traffic and port contact are not findings.

T1614 Discovery

System Location Discovery

Flags a cleartext GET from a client with no User-Agent or an automation one (curl, PowerShell, python-requests, Go) to a listed IP-geolocation service, or to any server whose answer is a record of the public address with three or more location fields such as country, city or coordinates. A Low indicator: legitimate software also looks up its location, and the answer's values are never reproduced.

Lateral Movement 9 techniques

T1021.001 Lateral Movement

Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Reports internal RDP sessions confirmed by a parsed TPKT/X.224 handshake as Low service-use indicators. A SYN to port 3389 alone does not qualify, and login outcome and host activity are not inferred.

T1021.002 Lateral Movement

Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Detects client SMB2 TREE_CONNECT requests to ADMIN$ and drive shares such as C$ and D$, with the server's status when visible. IPC$, share names inside file data and server responses are excluded.

T1021.003 Lateral Movement

Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model

Detects DCOM remote activation requests to IRemoteSCMActivator and ISystemActivator (opnums 3 and 4) as Low lateral-movement indicators, attributed to the requesting client.

T1021.004 Lateral Movement

Remote Services: SSH

Reports internal SSH sessions identified by an SSH-2.0 or SSH-1.99 banner as Low service-use indicators. A SYN to port 22 is not enough; authentication and tunneling inside the encrypted session are not inferred.

T1021.005 Lateral Movement

Remote Services: VNC

Reports internal VNC sessions identified by a parsed RFB version banner, while the authentication ledger records the VNC security result. A SYN to port 5900 is not enough.

T1021.006 Lateral Movement

Remote Services: Windows Remote Management

Detects internal POST /wsman requests with a SOAP content type as Low WinRM indicators. Contact with ports 5985/5986 and generic HTTP do not qualify; host execution is not inferred.

T1210 Lateral Movement

Exploitation of Remote Services

Detects Zerologon-style bursts (20 or more all-zero Netlogon ReqChallenge/Authenticate3 calls within 60 seconds) and PrintNightmare-style spoolss AddPrinterDriverEx calls with a UNC driver path. Normal domain logons are excluded; EternalBlue and BlueKeep signatures are not part of this rule.

T1550.003 Lateral Movement

Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket

Flags the same Kerberos ticket ciphertext presented by different hosts, excluding dual-stack and roaming identities that share a MAC address. A cached TGT used without a preceding AS-REQ is not evidence on its own.

T1570 Lateral Movement

Lateral Tool Transfer

Detects executables written to administrative shares (SMB CREATE plus WRITE at offset 0 with a checked PE, ELF or script header), internal HTTP uploads and downloads of executable content, and FTP STOR/RETR transfers with the sending side. The transfer is observed; execution is not inferred.

Command and Control 13 techniques

T1071.001 Command and Control

Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Flags HTTP(S) sessions to one destination that start at regular intervals (at least five payload-bearing sessions with bounded variance) and adds parsed User-Agent and request context. Retransmissions, normal polling and a single TLS connection are not treated as C2.

T1071.004 Command and Control

Application Layer Protocol: DNS

Keeps per-client, per-registered-domain statistics of unique encoded query names and their rate, with response context, to surface DNS tunneling and DNS-based C2. CDN and DKIM names, repeated polling and single long queries are excluded; results are indicators.

See Use Case

T1090 Command and Control

Proxy

Reports parsed HTTP CONNECT requests with the requested authority as Low indicators. A SYN to a proxy port, including 8443, is not evidence of a proxy or a C2 tunnel.

T1090.003 Command and Control

Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy

Flags external TLS handshakes with a random-shaped SNI and random-shaped certificate subject and issuer names, with no earlier DNS query from the client: the shape of a Tor handshake. Reported as a low-confidence indicator.

T1095 Command and Control

Non-Application Layer Protocol

Reports GRE (IP protocol 47) tunnels as one Low indicator per endpoint pair. VPN and routing infrastructure use GRE legitimately, so the finding is for comparison with approved tunnels.

T1105 Command and Control

Ingress Tool Transfer

Detects executables, macro documents and scripts delivered by external servers: a correlated 2xx response with a checked PE, ELF, Mach-O or OLE header, a macro ZIP marker, or script content with file-name and MIME context. High for non-browser clients and raw-IP hosts, Medium for browsers. Payloads disguised as text are recognised too: a base64-encoded PE with its header first (High), and, for clients that are not browsers (including the Windows script hosts' IE 7 compatibility User-Agent), a body of 64 KiB or more that is one run of base64 or a script built from string chunks (Medium). In encrypted traffic, flags a second TLS client that offers no TLS 1.3 or no ALPN and downloads 64 KiB or more from a name the browser opened less than two minutes earlier; High when the same host also looks up its public address.

See Use Case

T1219 Command and Control

Remote Access Software

Detects established, protocol-confirmed sessions of TeamViewer, AnyDesk, RustDesk, ScreenConnect, NetSupport, Radmin and Kaseya. A SYN to a well-known vendor port is not enough.

T1568 Command and Control

Dynamic Resolution

Matches contacted names against a versioned list of dynamic-DNS provider suffixes on exact label boundaries. Reported as a Low indicator, because dynamic DNS has legitimate uses.

T1568.002 Command and Control

Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms

Flags a client that receives NXDOMAIN for 10 or more distinct registered domains with long, high-entropy alphanumeric labels within 10 minutes. Popular domains are excluded; the queried names are listed as evidence.

T1571 Command and Control

Non-Standard Port

Flags HTTP, TLS or SSH confirmed by payload on an unexpected external server port. Common alternate ports and internal services are excluded; reported as an indicator.

T1572 Command and Control

Protocol Tunneling

Detects ICMP tunnels: six or more matched echo transactions within 60 seconds whose replies carry distinct high-entropy payloads of 128 bytes or more, with identical ping payloads excluded. Public tunneling-service domains are reported as Low context.

T1573.001 Command and Control

Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

After an observed TCP handshake, flags a first payload of 256 bytes or more with entropy of at least 7 bits per byte that matches no known protocol, file or compression header. Database and VPN ports are excluded; reported as an unclassified-binary indicator.

T1573.002 Command and Control

Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography

Flags TLS certificates that match a known C2-framework default, such as the Cobalt Strike default certificate, or several unusual certificate attributes on an external non-standard TLS service. Certificates are visible only before TLS 1.3, which encrypts them.

Exfiltration 4 techniques

T1020 Exfiltration

Automated Exfiltration

Flags six or more outbound upload bursts to one destination separated by idle gaps of at least 30 seconds at regular intervals with a low coefficient of variation. The finding indicates automation; volume alone does not prove exfiltration.

T1048 Exfiltration

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Measures uploads per service from private to public addresses and flags an upload-to-download ratio of 3 or more above a protocol-specific volume threshold. Reported as an indicator, because data sensitivity and intent are not visible on the wire. Separately, flags mail an internal host sends to an SMTP server on the internet (port 25, 465, 587 or 2525) within five minutes of asking a lookup service for its public address, the exfiltration of infostealers; High within two minutes, even when STARTTLS hides the message.

See Use Case

T1048.003 Exfiltration

Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol

Links FTP STOR commands to the PORT, EPRT, PASV or EPSV data channel of the same control session within 60 seconds and flags uploads of 20 MB or more with an upload ratio of 3 or more. The report keeps the file name and the correct active or passive direction.

See Use Case

T1567.002 Exfiltration

Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Flags internal hosts uploading to parsed cloud-storage providers and buckets, with direction and bytes per service. SNI or Host alone identifies the service and is not treated as exfiltration.

Impact 3 techniques

T1496 Impact

Resource Hijacking

Parses Stratum JSON-RPC (mining.subscribe, mining.authorize, mining.submit) and XMRig login, job and submit messages as High findings. Mining-pool domains and client data sent to common pool ports are Low indicators; scan SYNs and loopback traffic are excluded.

T1498.001 Impact

Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood

Flags a destination that receives sustained traffic of 10,000 packets per second or 50 Mbit/s over a 10-second window, with the source named when a single host sends it. Resolver, QUIC and voice traffic rates are not treated as floods.

See Use Case

T1498.002 Impact

Network Denial of Service: Reflection Amplification

Refines a flood into reflection when 10 or more UDP sources send unsolicited DNS, NTP or SSDP responses that make up at least 80% of the volume and exceed four times the matching request bytes. Responses are checked for protocol response semantics, not only source ports.

See Use Case

Common Questions

Frequently Asked Questions

About MITRE ATT&CK network detection and how PcapAI maps packet captures to technique IDs.

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